

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3371

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4820

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, GR, TU

SUBJ:PERMREP DISCUSSION OF SUSPENSION OF US BASE OPERATIONS
IN TURKEY

REF: USNATO 4759 DTG 021650Z SEP 75

SUMMARY: AT PRIVATE MEETING OF PERMREP SEPT 4
ON SUSPENSION OF US BASE OPERATIONS IN TURKEY, TURKISH
PERMREP ERALP UNDERSCORED RESTRAINT SHOWN BY GOT,
LAUDED US ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AND STRESSED NEED
FOR ALLIED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OFFSET EFFECTS OF
US EMBARGO. END SUMMARY.

1. AT REQUEST OF ERALP, PERMREPS, LESS PORTUGAL, MET
SEPT 4 PRIVATELY WITH LUNS TO DISCUSS MC PAPER ON
SUSPENSION OF US BASE OPERATIONS IN TURKEY (DCMCM 26-75)
AND TURKISH MILREP COMMENTS THEREON (DCMCM 29-75)
(TEXTS CONTAINED IN USDELMC MESSAGES 1211500Z AUG 75
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AND 291217Z AUG 75 NOTAL). LUNS STATED THAT SUSPEN-
SION OF BASE OPERATIONS AFFECTS BOTH US AND NATO
INTERESTS: MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE SIGNED OUT
PARTICULARLY THE IMPACT ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

OPERATIONS AS MOST SEVERE.

2. ERALP REFERRED TO GOT RESTRAINT, IN FACE BOTH OF SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF EMBARGO AND OF FRUSTRATION OF TURKISH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENT, AND TO "VALUABLE" EFFORTS BY US ADMINISTRATION TO LIFT EMBARGO. INDICATING THAT TURKISH MEASURES WERE NOT RETALIATORY BUT INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF US ACTION, HE STRESSED GOT DESIRE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS OF COOPERATION. REFERRING TO MC PAPER, HE RECALLED TURKISH MC REP'S COMMENTS DESIGNED TO "CORRECT SOME FACTUAL INACCURACIES." FINALLY, HE CALLED FOR REMEDIAL ACTION BY ALLIES TO OFFSET EFFECTS OF EMBARGO. (FULL TEXT OF ERALOP'S REMARKS BELOW.)

3. IN RESPONSE TO ERALP'S SUGGESTION THAT LUNS SPEAK ABOUT IMPACT OF EMBARGO IN COURSE OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN MEETING OF NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY TO BE HELD IN COPENHAGEN WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22, LUNS AGREED TO TRY ESPECIALLY TO PERUSADE US CONGRESSMEN TO RECONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE ON THE EMBARGO. WHILE NOTING THAT NAA SESSION WOULD FOLLOW EARLY SEPTEMBER MEETINGS OF US CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON EMBARGO, AMBASSADOR BRUCE SAID HE CONSIDERED THE NAA A SUSEFUL PLATOFRM.

4. MENZIES APPLAUDED TURKSIH FORBEARANCE, AND ERALP REPORTED THAT CANADIANS HAD INDICATED IN ANKARA THEIR READINESS TO PROVIDE SPARE PARTS.

5. LUNS INVITED PERMREPS TO CONVEY RESULTS OF DISCUSSION TO GOVERNMENTS, UNDERLINING ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EVEN MODEST ALLIED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. BEGIN TEXT:

DURING THE COUNCIL MEETING OF JULY 29, I EXPLAINED
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THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING MY GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SUSPEND ACTIVITIES ON ALL COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY AS A RESULT OF THE INISISTENCE OF THE US CONGRESS ON A COMPLETE EMBARGO. I SHALL NOT GO INTO THOSE DETAILS ONCE AGAIN. HOWEVER I WOULD LIKE TO STATE ONCE AGAIN THAT DESPITE THE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMBARGO ON OUR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND ON OUR CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S DEFENCE, THE FRUSTRATIONS CAUSED ON OUR PUBLIC OPINION AS WELL AS ON OUR PARLIAMENT, MY GOVERNMENT HAS FOR MONTHS SHOWED UTMOST RESTRAINT. THE VALUABLE EFFORTS DEPLOYED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION TO REDRESS THE SITUATION HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN OF GREAT HELP IN THAT RESPECT.

I SHOULD RE-EMPHASISE THAT THE MEASURES PUT INTO EFFECT BY MY GOVERNMENT WERE NOT RETALIATORY IN NATURE BUT AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE US ACTION TAKEN INTO CONTRAVENTION OF THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BOTH BILATERAL AND IN VIRTUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. THEY SHOULD ALSO NEITHER BE VIEWED AS A RUPTURE OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN THE BILATERAL FIELD, NOR OF A NATURE TO DISRUPT THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CONFINED TO NATO FUNCTIONS. WE HAVE STATED OUR READINESS TO CONTINUE THE ALREADY INITIATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A NEW BASIS OF COOPERATION AND I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS URGENTLY NEEDED UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE COOPERATION AND CONTRIBUTION BY ALL OF OUR ALLIES TO CREATE BETTER CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS BY DOING THEIR BEST TO MEET OUR IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS.

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USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4820

LIMDIS

AS TO THE REPORT ENTITLED "ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS TO NATO OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY", SUBMITTED TO US BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES UPON A SUGGESTION OF OUR ITALIAN COLLEAGUE, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE TASK OF THE IMS WAS NOT AN EASY ONE AND THUS THE REPORT CONTAINS INEVITABLY SOME SHORTCOMINGS AND INACCURACIES. THE DIFFICULTY TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EXTENT WHICH THESE INSTALLATIONS SERVE US NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THOSE OF NATO, THOUGH NOT A VALID REASON TO BLUR THE BASIC BILATERAL CHARACTER OF THE INSTALLATIONS, ALSO ADDS TO THE SHORTCOMINGS

OF THE REPORT. I RECOGNIZE HOWEVER THAT TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION IS NOT AN EASY TASK AND MAY NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE WHOLE EXERCISE. I SHALL NOT THEREFORE ATTEMPT TO GO INTO THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE REPORT AND NEITHER SHALL I ELABORATE ON THE MERITS OF THE CONCLUSION IT REACHES BASED UPON THE LIMITED ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION. NOR DO I SEE THE NECESSITY FOR FURTHER STUDIES DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ESSENCE OF AND THE REMEDY FOR THE SECRET

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MATTER IN OUR VIEW DOES NOT LIE IN THIS CONTEXT. I SHALL ONLY TRY TO CORRECT SOME FACTUAL INACCURACIES OF THE REPORT ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES WHICH WAS DISTRIBUTED AS AN ADDENDUM TO THE ASSESSMENT (DCMCM-29-75 DATED AUGUST 27):

THE DECISION OF MY GOVERNMENT AFFECTS ONLY THOSE PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES WHICH THE US FORCES IN TURKEY WERE ENJOYING ABOVE AND BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE NATO/SOFA AND IN CERTAIN CASE AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR COORDINATION WITH DESIGNATED TURKISH COMMAND HAS BEEN INTRODUCED. IN THIS CONTEXT:

A) THE US SQUADRONS AT THE INCIRLIK COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS CONTINUE TO CARRY ON THEIR NATO FUNCTIONS AS WELL AS THEIR PROGRAMS,

B) THE SPECIAL AMMUNITION STOCKS (SAS) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEIR STATUS AND ACTIVITIES,

C) THE LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS I.E. PORT FACILITIES, OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT, POL SUPPLY ETC AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS OF THE US FORCES ARE MAINTAINED.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS WILL NOT PRODUCE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON NATO'S INTERESTS AS A WHOLE, REGARDLESS OF REGION OR COUNTRY. BUT WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EMBARGO DECISION ON THE ONE HAND, WHICH DRASTICALLY CURTAILED TURKEY'S SELF-DEFENCE CAPABILITY AS WELL AS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S DEFENCE, AND ON THE OTHER, THE DECISION OF SUSPENSION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS. IT WOULD BE SHORTSIGHTED, IN OUR VIEW, TO DWELL AT LENGTH UPON THE EFFECT RATHER THAN TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE AND TO ATTEMPT TO REMEDY IT.

IT IS SELF EVIDENT THAT THE FOREMOST OBLIGATION OF ANY GOVERNMENT IS TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN SELF DEFENCE. IT IS ONLY THEN THAT IT CAN EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON DEFENCE. ONCE A COUNTRY IS DEPRIVED OF THE MEANS OF DEFENDING ITSELF THROUGH THE ACTION OF ANOTHER ALLY, THE OPERATION OF COMMON DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS BECOMES A SECONDARY AND SUBSIDIARY MATTER. WHAT, FOR INSTANCE, IS THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY WARNING IF WE DO NOT POSSESS THE MEANS SWIFTLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO REACT TO SUCH INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING?

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IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE HAVE APPEALED
TO OUR ALLIES TO SHOW A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN FILLING THE
GAP WHICH THE EMBARGO TOGETHER WITH ALL ITS FAR REACHING
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IS CREATING.WE BELIEVE THAT, WHEN
VIEWED FROMTHIS ANGLE, THE CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH OUR ALLIES
COULD TAKE ASSSUME A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. MY AUTHORITIES,
THEREFORE, ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE LIFTING OF THE
EMBARGO AND TO REMEDIAL ACTION BY OUR ALLIES,WHICH CONSTITUTE
THE CORE OF THE MATTER. I BELIEVE THAT THE MEETING WE HAVE
HELD LAST WEEK IN THIS SAME FORUM HAS BEEN USEFUL IN THIS
RESPECT AND I HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THIS
EXERCISE EFFICIENTLY. END TEXT.BRUCE

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